Anti-Americanism and Americanophobia: A French Perspectives by Lacorne, Denis
Denis Lacorne - Anti-Americanism and Americanophobia : A French Perspective - March 2005 
http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org  
 
1
 
ANTI-AMERICANISM AND AMERICANOPHOBIA : 
 A FRENCH PERSPECTIVE 
 
Denis Lacorne 
CERI/FNSP 
 
 
 
 
 
French anti-Americanism has never been as much the focus of debate as it is today. This is 
true both in France, where a crop of books has appeared on the subject, and in the United 
States, for reasons linked to the French refusal to support the American invasion of Iraq. 
Some authors have underlined the unchanging nature of the phenomenon, defining anti-
Americanism as a historical “constant” since the 18th century, or again an endlessly repetitive 
“semantic block” to use Philippe Roger’s expression. Others, like Jean-François Revel, have 
tried to show what lay hidden behind such a fashionable ideology: a deep-rooted critique of 
economic liberalism and American democracy. Yet others, while rejecting the anti-American 
label, like Emmanuel Todd, have attempted to lift the veil and lay bare the weaknesses of 
American democracy and the extreme economic fragility of an American empire “in decline,” 
despite appearances.1 
  
Contradictions and swings in public opinion 
What I propose to do here, rather than pick out historical constants, defend the virtues of the 
liberal model, or pontificate upon the inevitable decline of great empires, is to take a closer 
look at the contradictions of what I view as a changing and ambiguous phenomenon, a 
subject of frequent swings in public opinion. In The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism (1990) 
Jacques Rupnik and I pointed out that 
 
France is a heterogeneous country made up of countless different groups, every one 
of which has its “own” image of America, which frequently changes in the light of 
circumstances or political events. However, it sometimes happens that this multitude 
of contradictory perceptions coalesces into a major trend of opinion and for a while 
                                                
1 Philippe Roger, L’ennemi américain. Généalogie de l’antiaméricanisme français, Paris, Seuil, 2002; Jean-
François Revel, l’obsession anti-américaine, Paris, Plon, 2002; Emmanuel Todd, Après l’empire. Essai sur la 
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the attitudes of the country as a whole are either exaggeratedly favourable or 
excessively unfavourable to American realities.2 
 
Such contrasting swings of opinion have indeed occurred over the past three years, first due 
to France’s reaction to the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and later to France’s 
opposition to the second Gulf war.  
 
To properly bring out the complexity of French opinion, its ambiguities and frequent 
contradictions, I propose going back to the year 2000, before the upheavals of the 2001-
2003 period. This was a peaceful time in Franco-American relations. According to a 2000 
SOFRES poll, sympathy for the United States (41% of French respondents) was stronger 
than animosity (10%), and at first sight, French respondents seemed to be more 
Americanophile than anything else. However, the very proportion of those who refused to 
commit themselves one way or another (48%) was disquieting, -- suggesting a kind of 
discomfort before the American big brother.3 To get a clearer picture, SOFRES, in the same 
poll, included an open-ended question, leaving a wide margin to respondents: “When you 
think of the United States, what words and images come to your mind?”  
 
 
[TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE] 
 
As Table 1 clearly shows, most spontaneous images of America (56%) turned out to be 
negative. When the French thought of the United States, the first thing that came to mind 
was violence (mentioned by 21% of the respondents) in every form (physical violence, drugs, 
the death penalty, uncontrolled gun sales), or again the weird or excessive aspects of the 
American character (14%), including the “obesity of Americans” and the “junk” they eat (3%). 
The complaints so common in the 1960s and 1970s against “American imperialism” or 
“capitalism” were now barely mentioned (respectively 3% et 2% of responses). As for 
spontaneously mentioned positive aspects, what is striking is that none of them had anything 
to do with American democracy. When the French hold a positive opinion of the United 
States, they cite, in order of importance, American grandeur or gigantism (14%), American 
                                                                                                                                                   
décomposition du système américain, Paris, Gallimard, 2002. For a discussion of these works, see Tony Judt’s 
chapter XXX in this volume.  
2 Denis Lacorne and Jacques Rupnik,”France Bewitched by America,” in D. Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik and Marie-
France Toinet (eds.), The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism. A Century of French Perception, Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, 1990, p. 2. (trans. from the original French by Gerald Turner, L’Amérique dans les têtes. Un siècle de 
fascinations et d’aversions, Paris, Hachette, 1986.) 
3 French American Foundation-SOFRES Poll, May 2000. Responses to the question: “Would you rather say your 
feelings for the United States were a) positive; b) negative; or c) neither positive nor negative?”  
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power (12%), or superior technology… It is clear that for the French, America is not a political 
model. An insignificant number of the respondents specifically referred to key elements of 
economic or political liberalism, such as “individualism” (2%),”freedom” (4%),”liberalism” or 
“capitalism” without elaborating (3%). One even comes away with the impression – and this 
goes to prove the ignorance of the average Frenchman about America – that recent 
immigrants are more easily assimilated in France than in the United States.4  
 
These few data suggest that the French didn’t turn anti-American all of a sudden in 2003, at 
the time of the American invasion of Iraq. They were so before the Gulf War. Or rather, they 
were already of two minds, their empathy mingled with indifference, their admiration with 
doubt and distrust of the abnormalities of American society.  
 
Who shapes opinion? The SOFRES study does not give a clear answer. But we could 
suggest a few explanations, particularly for the frequent criticism in France against the 
violence and racism of American society. The media may be partly to blame: films, news and 
current affairs programs, and all the French debates about the injustice and barbarity of the 
death penalty in the United States. There seem to be good reasons for the United States to 
become unpopular with the French, even if, as I hope to show, some of our “belles âmes” 
have overdone it to the extent of losing all credibility.5 
 
Let us now consider the three quick swings of public opinion which have occurred since 
September 2001.  
• First Phase: Extreme sympathy. Most of the French shared in the suffering of Americans, 
in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. One of the most well known newspaper 
editors marked the occasion with a slogan somewhat unusual in the post-war daily press: 
“We are all Americans!”6. French compassion expressed itself in a hundred different 
ways: from the oecumenical service performed at the American Church of Paris to the 
three mandatory minutes of silence imposed by the government on every school and 
public agency, the hundreds of drawings elementary school students in Normandy sent to 
the US embassy in Paris, and other more modest but symbolically significant gestures 
                                                
4 In answering a closed question about the social integration of immigrants, 50% of the respondents believed that, 
in the United States, “things weren’t better than in France” as opposed to 18% who thought the opposite. When 
asked to choose a word that best describes the United States (from a pre-established list), French respondents 
listed first “violence” (67%), and then, “power” (66%), inequality (49%), racism (43%). “Liberty” ranked 8
th
 and was 
only mentioned by 16% of the respondents.  
5 See, in this volume, Gérard Grunberg, XXXX pp. XXX, for a detailed and nuanced analysis of French and 
European opinion. 
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like the planting of a tree of liberty next to Bartholdi’s small bronze replica of the Statue of 
Liberty in the Luxemburg gardens in Paris. During the Bastille Day festivities of July 14, 
2002, the new compassionate love for America reached its climax with a red New York 
Fire Department truck leading the parade. It was followed by an entire class of West 
Point cadets that came to Paris to celebrate the bicentennial of their school – founded in 
the same year as the French military academy –, their Saint Cyr comrades marching 
alongside.  
 
• Second Phase: Emergence of differences of opinion between France and the United 
States with the U.N. resolutions on Iraq. What came as a surprise in France, was the 
near-unanimous public support for Chirac’s critical stance, a situation where the political 
left, right and far right seemed to have joined the same chorus. Stranger still, French 
opinion coincided perfectly with widespread European popular opposition to the war, 
making it possible to say that there is such a thing as a common, unified European public 
opinion.7 On March 28th, when the war began, French public opinion confirmed its 
massive support for Chirac’s foreign policy: 78% of a polled sample opposed the 
American intervention. More surprisingly, a quarter of the French (and nearly two-thirds of 
French Muslims) felt themselves “on the Iraqi side” and, according to the same survey,” 
deep down,” 33% of the respondents “did not wish the United States to win” (among 
them, 72% of French Muslims).8 In a most unprecedented declaration, the Prime Minister 
felt obliged to say, in Clermont-Ferrand on March 31st 2003: “Be careful not to pick the 
wrong enemy. [...] Opposing the war doesn’t mean that we’re hoping for dictatorship to 
win over democracy.9  
 
A note of discord did emerge within the French elite. Influential intellectuals such as Pierre 
Hassner (otherwise extremely critical of the methods used by the Bush administration) spoke 
out in support of good sense and realism, against French diplomatic activism and the 
ephemeral alliance it forged with Russia, Germany and China, a combination intended to 
                                                                                                                                                   
6 Title of an editorial by Jean-Marie Colombani, Chief Editor of Le Monde (12 September 2001). A year later, 
observing the rise in trans-Atlantic tensions, Colombani wondered whether the French hadn’t “all become anti-
American.” Id. “L’impasse américaine,” Le Monde, 11 September 2002.  
7 See Olivier Duhamel “Une opinion publique européenne,” Journal du Dimanche, 9 February 2003. In Europe, 
never did more than 10% of any polled sample express an opinion favoring unilateral intervention in Iraq. In 
Britain, a relative majority of the polled population was opposed to any war (41%); the anti-war majority was 
significant in Germany (50%), substantial in France (60%), and massive in Spain (74%). EOS-Gallup Europe Poll, 
29 January 2003, quoted by Duhamel. 
8 Polls, Le Monde-TF1, 28-29 March 2003 and IPSOS-Le Figaro, 1-3 April 2003, Le Figaro, 5 April 2003 (based 
on a national sample of French Muslims).  
9 Quoted in Le Monde, 3 April 2003. 
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counterbalance the power of the United States: “Even if we refuse to take orders from Bush, 
we can’t have the butcher of Chechnya or Tibet commanding us instead.”10  
 
• Third Phase: Appeasement and reconciliation. Preparations for the G8 summit at Evian 
(June 2003) became an opportunity to resume friendly French-US relations. Indeed Bush 
concluded his Le Figaro interview with an unexpected “Vive la France!,” preceded by the 
admission that “between allies, we might have our differences, but what brings the United 
States closer to France, to Europe, is far more important.”11 At the same time, an officer 
of the American forces posted at Kabul stressed the eminently positive role of the French 
forces helping the Americans rebuild an Afghan army.  “Out here,” he pointed out to a 
visiting American senator, “we’ve still got French fries.”12 French Defense Minister Alliot-
Marie’s visit to the Pentagon, on January 22, 2004, was a major step in the restoration of 
frayed ties between France and United States. It was designed to prepare a visit to 
Normandy by President Bush in June 2004 to participate in the commemoration of the 
60th anniversary of D-Day, — the planned highlight of a final Franco-American 
reconciliation.13  
 
Still, whatever the ups and downs of the transatlantic relationship, we would be well advised 
not to ignore the vigour and tenacity of anti-American feelings in France. This is proven by 
the sales figures of a whole new literary genre of books about the “murky side of America.” 
These publications indiscriminately denounce the more monstrous aspects of American 
civilization. For example:  
 
Noël Mamère and Patrick Farbiaz, Dangereuse Amérique [Dangerous America], (Ramsay, 
2002) 
Peter Scowen, Le Livre Noir des États-Unis [The Black Book of the United States], (Mango, 
2002) 
                                                
10 Pierre Hassner, “Europe/Etats-Unis: la tentation du divorce,” Politique Internationale, no. 100, Summer 2003, p. 
173. Equally strong criticism was expressed by French business leaders and supporters of the “droit d’ingérence,” 
among them André Glucksmann, Bernard-Henry Lévy, Bernard Kouchner, Bruno Latour, and Pascal Bruckner. 
See Laure Belot and Sophie Fay, “Les milieux d’affaires redoutent un divorce franco-américain,” Le Monde, 4 
April, 2003; André Glucksmann, “L’étrange renversement,” Le Monde, 5 April 2003 and Bruno Latour, “Pourquoi 
cet abîme?,” ibid.; “America, je t’aime toujours,” Bernard Henri Lévy, (interview with Matthew Campbell), Sunday 
Times, 2 November 2003. 
11 Bush, “Je suis décidé à travailler avec la France” (interview), Le Figaro, 30 May 2003. Curiously, The Times in 
London, interpreted the same event in a quite different way, under the title: “Bush Diplomacy Begins With Attack 
On France,” Times, 31 May 2003, p. 23. 
12 Andrew Higgins, “For U.S., Waging Peace Still Requires Support From Contrarian Allies,” Wall Street Journal 
(Europe), 17 June 2003. 
13 Keith Richeburg, “French Defense Minister Visits U.S. in Fence-Mending Mission,” Washington Post/Wall Street 
Journal Europe, January 16, 2004. 
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Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Davies, Pourquoi le Monde Déteste-t-il l’Amérique? [Why Does 
The World Hate  America ?], (Fayard, 2002) 
Thierry Meyssan, L’Effroyable Imposture [The Appalling Imposture], (Carnot, 2002)  
Gilbert Achcar, Le Choc des Barbaries [The Clash of Barbarians], (Complexe, 2002) 
Eric Laurent, La Guerre des Bush: les Secrets Inavouables [Bush’s War: The Unspeakable 
Secrets], (Plon 2003). 
 
All these books tell a similar tale of misdeeds, horrors, and threats – the American 
colonization of the world compounded with an even more real colonization of minds, a 
foreign policy that is nothing but a series of terrible conspiracies (of oil barons, genetically 
modified food barons, the CIA and the Pentagon), brutal domineering behaviour, complete 
indifference to poverty and mass killings in the world – an indictment of American abuse of 
power and dominant position, US disrespect for international law, in a word the neo-colonial 
violence of a new Roman Empire. The portrayal of Bush in the media fulfilled all 
expectations. It seemed tailor-made – at last a president that America-haters always dreamt 
of, a splendid blend of the brutal sheriff and the fanatic missionary. These studies, as we 
might suspect, lacked scientific rigor. Guesses and impressions passed for truths and every 
manner of sophistry was deployed to prove the barbarity of America. George W. Bush, for 
instance, when he was still the Governor of Texas, was first portrayed as a bloodthirsty 
leader, with a finger firmly pressed on the switch of an electric chair. Elected President, 
Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces, Bush suddenly appeared in the role of a 
Christian crusader king, out to shake up the world, flying the standard of a puritan 
fundamentalist horde gone out of control. News headlines spoke of “George Bush’s Holy 
Crusade” (Libération),”War or Jehad?” (Le Courrier International), “Holy Wars” (Le Point), 
“Holy War against Jehad” (Le Nouvel Observateur),”The Clash of the Fundamentalists” (Le 
Monde), for over three weeks.14 
  
José Bové and Jean-Marie Messier: two grand causes, two fallen heroes of French 
modernity.  
We see that the protean anti-Americanism of the past few years has been nourished by 
contemporary world events, and fed also by fears and fantasies inherited from the 19th or 
early 20th Centuries. The anti-globalization rhetoric of José Bové, the “shepherd of Larzac,” is 
in fact little but a remake of the 1920s attacks on “Americanism,” pointing to the subservience 
of modest independent artisans to American corporate power, brutal assembly-line discipline, 
and the “dehumanized settings” of an industrial society excessively rationalized by the rules 
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of Fordianism or Taylorism – in short, a world devoid of pride in personal initiative and 
accomplishment.15  
 
Single-handedly taking on the American Goliath and its Taylorized food outlet — the 
McDonald’s fast-food chain –  José Bové proved that society had not totally silenced 
individual voices and that a lone David could check the inexorable advance of the juggernaut 
of food standardization. Wholesome food was contrasted to American “junk” (la malbouffe), 
the rich taste of a slice of Roquefort was compared with a tasteless, greasy, grilled mass of 
ground beef. A modern incarnation of the personnaliste philosophy of the thirties, José Bové 
symbolized a typically French form of resistance to American trade imperialism. His 
spectacular political protests launched with the support of the French Farmers’ Confederation 
– the destruction of a McDonald’s restaurant at Millau in the Aveyron16 (euphemistically 
termed a “dismantling” operation), or his active participation in anti-globalization protests at 
the WTO’s Seattle summit were happenings which established his omnipresence in the 
French media (he was of course barely mentioned in the US media). 
 
Acclaimed by leaders of the right and the left, united in their opposition to the uncontrolled 
globalization process, José Bové became a self-made myth: he embodied the virtues of 
great comic book heroes. He was at once Tintin in America, going after the evil producers of 
genetically modified foods, and Asterix at war against the legions of a new imperial Rome. 
 
Oddly enough, the rejection of “American” globalization, symbolized by José Bové, coincided 
with the emergence of a new type of French corporate globalization embodied by a truly 
Americanized French CEO, Jean-Marie Messier. A classic product of the elite “Grandes 
écoles” (Polytechnique and the National School of Administration), a high-ranking, respected 
civil servant in the Balladur government, Messier demonstrated that it was possible to live the 
American dream in France, first by changing careers, then by taking control of an old-style 
corporation, the Compagnie Générale des Eaux, and turning it into one of the biggest media 
and communications companies in the world, with its name appropriately changed to Vivendi 
Universal, after a series of spectacular mega-mergers. Like the frog in the fable that blew 
itself up to the size of an ox, this ordinary French company became one of the leading 
American multinationals, highly rated on Wall Street, gaining control of one of Hollywood 
                                                                                                                                                   
14 See D. Lacorne, “Mais non, cette guerre ne fut pas une croisade !,” Le Monde, 17 avril 2003. 
15 Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu, Décadence de la nation française, Paris, Editions Rieder, 1931, p. 107-108. 
16 Paradoxically, at the time when José Bové was attacking McDonald’s, sales of the 932 French McDonald’s 
went up by about 3% (between 2000 and 2001), while they fell by 1% in the United States. See Shirley Leung, 
“McHaute Cuisine,” Wall Street Journal, 30 August 2002. 
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major studios (Universal Studios), and adopting English as its working language to satisfy the 
wish of the majority of its board of directors. Messier, the exemplary Parisian bureaucrat, 
even chose to transfer his private residence to Park Avenue, in Manhattan, to better 
establish his American credentials.17  
 
However, these two emblematic figures of French modernity ended up as fallen heroes. José 
Bové landed in prison, sentenced by a French court for attacks on private property, and 
Messier in the end, was forced to quit the chairmanship of a company he had driven to the 
verge of bankruptcy. Both kinds of zeal led to failure. José Bové and Jean-Marie Messier, 
men who symbolized the difficult French transition to modernity and globalization, only 
revealed the paradox of French public opinion -- generally “suspicious” of globalization (72% 
of polled opinions, but acknowledging at the same time that globalization was a “good thing 
for France” (53%), and “especially good for French industry” (63%).18  
 
This inconsistency of the French surely reflects another paradox, observed in a recent study 
by Philip Gordon and Sophie Meunier: “While the French (often stridently) resist 
globalization, they also adapt to it (discreetly and usually better than many would suspect).”19 
Anti-American rhetoric should therefore never be taken literally: it is often accompanied by 
blatantly Americanophile rhetoric, an aspect too often overlooked by the media, and by 
authors who have made a career out of anti-Americanism.20  
  
Still, French anti-Americanism has a bright future. It feeds on a century-old tradition, and 
enjoys continuing support from leading political figures of all stripes, as well as from new 
lobbies, such as the Farmers’ Confederation founded by José Bové in 1987, and ATTAC, an 
anti-globalization public interest lobby launched in 1998 at the initiative of the editors of Le 
Monde Diplomatique. Echoing José Bové’s radical slogan, “I have one enemy, it’s the 
market!” Ignacio Ramonet, the editor-in-chief of Le Monde Diplomatique, declared in the 
same vein at about the same time: “let us disarm and defeat the market at all cost!”21 Bové 
                                                
17 See José Bové and François Dufour, The World is not for Sale. Farmers against junk food, London, Verso, 
2001.and Jean-Marie Messier, J6M.com. Faut-il avoir peur de la nouvelle économie?, Paris, Hachette, 2000. 
18 According to an IPSOS poll for Figaro Magazine of 26 May 2000, well analysed in Philip Gordon and Sophie 
Meunier Le Nouveau défi français. La France face à la mondialisation, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2002, pp. 143, 154 
(translated from id., The French Challenge. Adapting to Globalization, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution 
Press, 2001). According to the same poll, 35% of the French believe that “globalization is not a good thing for 
France” and 46% consider that it is not beneficial to workers (against 36% contrary opinions). Furthermore, 51% 
of the French questioned by the CSA on 30 June 2000 declared themselves favorable to José Bové’s views on 
globalization (p. 143). 
19Ibid., p. 19. 
20 For numerous expressions of americanophilia, see D.Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik and Marie-France Toinet, The 
Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism. op. cit. 
21 Cited in Philip Gordon and Sophie Meunier, Le nouveau défi français, op. cit., p. 148-159. 
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was popular because the leftwing media readily supported his cause without questioning his 
motivations.22 
 
The remarkable success of the French anti-globalization movement would not have been 
possible without the quasi-unanimous support of major French political parties. Among them 
are Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front, belligerently opposed to the globalization of trade 
during the European elections of 1999 as well as Charles Pasqua and Philippe de Villiers’ 
ultra-nationalist party, the Rassemblement pour la France, which lamented the sacrifice of 
the “grandeur of France upon the altar of globalization” (Pasqua termed it the “new 
totalitarianism of our times”). The Communist Party and its general secretary, Robert Hue, 
who denounced the horrors of “unbridled neo-liberal globalization” at WTO’s Seattle summit, 
to say nothing of the curious alliance of a Gaullist Chirac and a Socialist Jospin, both of 
whom have suggested ways to “tame” or “humanize” globalization as if it were some kind of 
wild beast that had to be reined in at all costs if the destruction of European cultures and 
economic systems were to be averted.  
 
Worried about the increasingly important role of American pension funds in the workings of 
the French stock exchange, Chirac publicly attacked the selfish interests of “California and 
Florida pensioners” while Jospin denounced the “dictatorship of shareholders,” imposed from 
across the Atlantic. Only the MEDEF (the leading organization of French business firms) and 
the centrists of Liberal Democracy, led by Alain Madelin, could see any good at all coming 
out of the globalization of liberal economies.23  
 
The illusion of transparency 
America is indeed an open society. News and information circulate freely, American media 
organizations dot the globe, European journalists encounter no special obstacles when they 
work in the United States, and the number of Europeans traveling to America rises from year 
to year. However, behind this apparent transparency the real workings of American society 
are far from obvious. We believe we know a great deal about America, but in fact we know 
very little… There are numerous reasons for such ignorance: negligence, lack of in-depth 
research, excessive reliance on hearsay and reductionist stereotypes, old-fashioned 
prejudices, and no doubt, a certain arrogance, based on a feeling of European cultural and 
moral superiority. It is so much easier to speak without trying to understand, to look without 
really seeing, to condemn before checking the facts. Two controversial topics can illustrate 
                                                
22 Ibid., pp. 17-19, 147, 150-155. ATTAC is said to have over 34,000 active members and to enjoy the support of 
130 French parliamentarians. 
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the actual ignorance that characterizes French views of America: multiculturalism and the 
death penalty.  
 
American multiculturalism has been, since the 1990s, the bête noire of the partisans of a 
secular, republican and assimilationist French society, who decry the importing of a 
“politically correct” ideology, radically foreign to our own French ways.24 Transplanted to in 
France, American multiculturalism is perceived as a mortal challenge the core of our 
centralist, republican tradition. The introduction of new forms of ethnic “identity politics”, the 
critics argue, would balkanize French society into rival “ethnic ghettos” or territorial 
“communities.” This, in turn, would prevent the assimilation of new immigrant groups and, in 
the end, precipitate the dissolution of the “One and Indivisible” French Republic. Worse, the 
acceptance of American-style multiculturalism could perpetuate regressive cultural practices 
like polygamy, female excision or forced marriage.25 
 
Criticism of the excesses of American multiculturalism is not entirely unjustified. The critics, 
however, seem to miss the forest for the trees. In fact, there hardly exists such a thing as 
“American multiculturalism.” There are different types of multiculturalism, and most radical 
and separatist forms are rare even in the United States26. Multiculturalism, however divisive, 
did not prevent America’s spontaneous surge of patriotism in the aftermath of the tragic 
events of September 11, 2001. Beneath the apparent confusion of a multicolored mosaic, 
there did survive a Unum, a common political culture, a patriotic fervor shared by all 
Americans, whether they happened to be recent immigrants – Europeans, Latinos, or Asians. 
Multiculturalism is not, as we seem to believe in France, a source of irreconcilable 
differences. The “disuniting” of America is no more real than the “balkanization” of France. 
Opposition to multiculturalism, a French variant of anti-Americanism, is closely related to an 
ancestral, obsessive fear of the fragmentation of the “One and Indivisible French Republic,” 
— a fear that can be traced back to the French Revolution and more specifically to the 
Jacobins’ denunciation of their political enemies, the Girondins, unfairly accused of wanting 
                                                                                                                                                   
23 Ibid. pp. 17-19, 150-155. 
24 For widely differing analyses of the “multiculturalist danger,” see the writings of Jean-Claude Barreau, Paul 
Yonnet, Alain Peyrefitte, etc., all analyzed in depth in D. Lacorne, La crise de l’identité américaine. Du melting-pot 
au multiculturalisme [The American Identity Crisis. From Melting pot to Multiculturalism], 2nd revised edition, Paris, 
Gallimard, coll. Tel, 2003, p. 31-36.  
25 Christian Jelen, “La régression multiculturaliste,” Le Débat, n° 97, November 1997, pp. 137-143, and more 
generally, id., Les casseurs de la Republique, Paris, Plon 1997. Six years later, Education Minister Luc Ferry 
denounced the “American logic” of the right to difference, a perfect “calamity,” which according to him, would 
aggravate the “communal excesses” that have proved so harmful for our schools. See Luc Bronner and Xavier 
Ternisien,”Le mauvais débat du communautarisme,” Le Monde, 12 April 2003. 
26 For a critical analysis of three competing visions of American multiculturalism, see La crise de l’identité 
américaine, op. cit., pp. 341-343. 
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to transform the new revolutionary regime into the chaos of a fragmented federal State, 
modelled on the American federal system.27  
 
The French debate on the death penalty in the U.S. is an equally striking example of the 
ignorance of French commentators. The life stories of American death-row inmates, such as 
Karla Faye Tucker, Betty Lou Beets, Gary Graham, Odell Barnes or Mumia Abu-Jamal are 
thoroughly familiar to readers of French newspapers and some of the most famous French 
intellectuals, like Jacques Derrida, have been mobilized to denounce the injustice of the 
death penalty. Jack Lang, a former education minister, visited Texas to spend a few minutes 
with Odell Barnes in the hope of influencing the state’s Board of Pardons. Robert Badinter, 
the former Chief Justice of the Constitutional Council, launched a press campaign against 
the U.S. death penalty, collecting close to a million signatures for a petition addressed to the 
newly elected American president, George W. Bush. Badinter found it deplorable that the 
“oldest democracy in the world and the greatest power on earth […] has now joined the head 
pack of homicidal states, together with China, Iran, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and Saudi Arabia. […]American society seems to be in the grip of a killing madness. And yet 
it has failed to rid itself of crime. All it has done is respond to killing with more killing.”28 Serge 
Tornay, a professor at the National Museum of Natural History, believed he had finally 
discovered the reason: it could all be explained by the “theocratic” nature of American 
democracy. “It just might be the case,” he wrote, “that human sacrifice, the notorious 
historical privilege of theocratic and totalitarian states, still constitutes a last resort. Faced 
with the threat of annihilation of their social order, Americans today, like the Aztecs long ago, 
are terrified by the prospect that the current cosmic cycle is coming to an end. Only the 
deaths of countless human beings, could generate enough energy to ward off the danger.”29  
 
The maintenance of the death penalty in America and its abolition in all European nations 
greatly facilitated the critics’inference: Europeans were civilized, in contrast to their American 
cousins, the barbarians.30 But the explanation was incomplete. Paradoxically, it is not due to 
a lack, but rather an excess of democracy, that America maintains such a cruel practice. 
Indeed, contrary to what most French critics seem to assume, Congress in fact has no 
                                                
27 The Girondins, according to Laurence Cornu (who quotes Buzot) were unjustly accused of “naturalizing in 
France the government of America.” Laurence Cornu, “Fédéralistes! et pourquoi?” in François Furet and Mona 
Ozouf (eds.), La Gironde et les Girondins, Paris, Payot, 1991, note 24, p. 284. 
28 Robert Badinter, “L’Amérique et la mort,” Nouvel Observateur, 17 March 1999. 
29 Serge Tornay, “De la théocratie en Amérique,” Le Monde, 2 February 1998. 
30 See D. Lacorne, “The Barbaric Americans,” Wilson Quarterly, Spring 2000, pp. 51-60 and Emmanuelle Le 
Texier, “L’Amérique au miroir de la presse française (1998-2000),” Revue Tocqueville, n°1, 2001, pp. 139-161. 
On the recent period, see the thorough and well-informed account by Justin Vaisse, “The Future of Transatlantic 
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authority to abolish the death penalty across the United States. Criminal law (with the 
exception of federal crimes) falls within the province of the states and it is up to their 
legislatures to decide to abolish or to retain the death penalty. In France, a simple majority 
vote in the National Assembly was all it took, in 1981, to abolish the death penalty, at a time 
when 62 percent of the French still favored the practice. In the US, federalism and local 
democracy tilt the balance in favor of a practice that many jurists recognize as cruel and 
unjust, especially vis-à-vis ethnic minorities. The death penalty lives on simply because it is 
the will of the people! Also, contrary to what has often been said in France, when George W. 
Bush was Governor of Texas, he was not personally responsible for his state’s high rate of 
executions: Final authority was not his, it resides exclusively with an independent Board of 
Pardons. 
 
Our ignorance can be explained by the tenacity of our centralist, Jacobin tradition. The 
concentration of power in the “ One and Indivisible” French Republic has not prepared us, 
French, to understand the workings of a federal government. Why in the world haven’t they, 
Americans, abolished the death penalty like we have? Could this be because they are less 
democratic, and therefore less civilized? The answer, as I have tried to show, is not quite as 
simple as it seems.  
 
There is indeed a “knowledge gap” between France and the United States. It concerns 
issues as different as the role of religion in American politics, the ravages — more imaginary 
than real – of “political correctness” and other such typically French exaggerations about the 
“horrors” of American feminism, or the seething anger of the American ghetto, verging on 
open warfare. The greater our ignorance, the more fanciful the stereotypes that serve to 
decipher American reality.  
 
 
Those not with us are against us.  
  
Francophobia, no doubt encouraged by the Bush administration, is an old phenomenon 
which can be traced back to Protestant England and was instrumental in building modern 
British nationalism, as well demonstrated by Linda Colley31. It was unleashed in the United 
States for a simple reason: the Bush administration could not tolerate any criticism from 
                                                                                                                                                   
Relations: a View from Europe,” Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 17 June 
2003. 
31 Linda Colley, Britons. Forging the nation, 1707-1837, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992. See also Denis 
Lacorne, « Les dessous de la francophobie », Le Nouvel Observateur, 27 février 2003 (interview).  
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Western allies, particularly those who should have been eternally grateful for the U.S. 
intervention in two world wars. In the field of international relations, eternal praise is not a 
common political value, even from friends and allies, and yet it was expected from the Bush 
administration. “Those not with us are against us” was the motto of the age. There was 
therefore no hesitation on the part of the American press, eager to please the White House, 
to describe French foreign policy as that of a “perfidious” if not “treacherous” nation, the sole 
aim of which was the failure of the US military strategy, (despite the thin evidence presented 
to the U.N. by Colin Powell of the existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction).32 We 
know today that this evidence was more fictitious than real and that the French criticism of an 
untimely war against Iraq was based on a healthy dose of critical thinking, perfectly justified 
under the circumstances. The French manner was perhaps inelegant: the threat to use the 
French veto at the U.N. “whatever the circumstances” was clumsy, to say the least, and the 
inability of the French to envisage an end to repeated rounds of inspections aroused doubt 
about the good faith of French diplomats.33 But to go so far as to accuse the French of 
treason was a line that only the most vicious Francophobes could cross.  
 
That line was indeed crossed by several established (and not so established) members of 
the American press. It was a good time for bashing the French, those disgusting “cheese 
eating surrender monkeys” (The Simpsons) – a phrase that was endlessly repeated in signed 
and unsigned editorials. Murdoch’s press pictured president Chirac as a “weasel” running 
away from responsibility (The New York Post), or a wriggling worm (The Sun, in England), 
and stranger still, The Wall Street Journal portrayed Chirac as a “transvestite, balding, pygmy 
Joan of Arc”34. French leaders became a band of cowards who slunk away the moment 
things got hot, forgetting how America had saved France twice from disaster. As for our 
intellectuals, suffering, in the words of Jonah Goldberg, the editor of the National Review On 
Line, from “mental fecal impaction,” they naively believed that Old Europe still meant 
something, that it still carried weight in the world arena. Which is why, our visionary 
explained, “Hollywood morons and French intellectuals alike find the taste of Fidel Castro’s 
posterior so palatable.”35 At the US Congress cafeteria, French fries had become ‘liberty fries’ 
to play up to the most xenophobic of American congressmen. One of the most merciless 
                                                
32 Geoffrey Nunberg, “A Lexicon of Francophobia, from Emerson to Fox TV,” New York Times, 9 February 2003. 
Charles Krauthammer, a Washington Post columnist, denounced the “sabotage” France had resorted to one 
month before the invasion of Iraq: “Yet the lengths to which France has gone to oppose the United States show 
that the stakes are much higher. France has gone far beyond mere objection, far beyond mere obstruction. It is 
engaged in sabotage […],” Washington Post, 21 février 2003. 
33 Pierre Hassner, “Guerre: qui fait le jeu de qui?,” Le Monde, 25 February 2003; id., “Etats-Unis-Itak-Europe: le 
troisième round,” Le Monde, 26 April 2003. 
34 As cited in « Francophobia.com », www.tf1.fr, Feb. 12, 2003. 
35 The American Enterprise Magazine Online, December 2002, www.taemag.com/taedec02d.htm 
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cartoons of President Chirac portrayed him as a transvestite, in a “compromising position” 
with a particularly virile Saddam Hussein, in simulated advertisements for condoms, with the 
legend: “’Republican Guard’: the only proven protection for your weapon of mass 
destruction.”36 
 
The historical origins of French Americanophobia  
Just as American Francophobia must be distinguished, for the sake of clarity, from American 
critiques of French politics and society, Americanophobia must be distinguished from mere 
anti-Americanism. By anti-Americanism, I mean the critical and reasoned expression of a 
disagreement with what Americans say or do. By Americanophobia, I mean the total visceral 
rejection of anything that has to do with American culture, democracy, or economy, in short, 
with American civilization. Anti-Americanism expresses itself through critical acts or words; it 
may not be reasonable, but it is openly debated in the public sphere and is related to the 
concrete events that mark the ups and downs of Franco-American relations. Philippe Roger 
and Jean-François Revel’s recent books abound in examples of this nature (see Chapter 
one).  
  
The story of French Americanophobia is an old one, going back to the beginnings of the 
trans-Atlantic relationship. It was best expressed in Cornelius de Pauw’s virulent thesis of 
American degeneracy. In his Recherches Philosophiques sur les Américains, published in 
1768, the primary concern of this Dutch priest who wrote in French and worked at the court 
Frederick the Great, was to serve the interests of his master. Realizing that the prince wished 
to discourage German emigration to North America, and inspired by Buffon and some French 
explorers, de Pauw argued that, in America, all natural forms, whether vegetal, animal or 
human, had degenerated to the point of having a shrunken appearance. His essay clearly 
aimed at terrifying the future North European settlers. Hence his dramatic description of the 
pernicious effects of the American climate on four-legged animals “more than six times 
smaller than their European counterparts,” on moronic human creatures, contaminated in 
every part of their organism37 and rendered feeble by the horrors of famine and hunger. De 
Pauw did not hesitate to affirm that:  
 
                                                
36 Image posted on the website www.StrangeCosmos.com. See Julie Loudner, “La nouvelle francophobie” 
dissertation for the Cycle supérieur d’études américaines of the Ecole doctorale at the IEP, Paris, June 2003; 
Justin Vaisse, “Etats-Unis, le regain francophobe,” Politique Internationale, n° 97, Fall 2002; D. Lacorne, “Les 
dessous de la francophobie,” Le Nouvel Observateur, 27 February 2003 (interview); “Fuck la France. Comment 
les Américains nous jugent aujourd’hui,” special issue of L’Echo des Savanes, May, 2003 
37 Cornelius de Pauw, Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains, in Œuvres Philosophiques de Pauw 
[original edition: 1768], Paris, Jean-François Bastien, an III de la République (1792), vol. 1, p. 2. 
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American tigers and lions were entirely mongrelized, undersized, cowardly and a 
thousand times less dangerous than those of Asia and Africa […]; wolves, wolverines 
and bears also occurred as miniatures in this land, and were less audacious than 
their counterparts on the old continent. […]. Finally, a generalized mutation and 
bastardization had affected all four-legged creatures in this part of the world, deep 
down to the very principles of life and its regeneration.38 
 
Animals brought from Europe survived with difficulty in the New World, to the point of “dogs 
losing their voice, and ceasing to bark in most of the countries of the new continent.” On the 
contrary, the most repugnant animals escaped this phenomenon and were of sufficiently 
impressive sizes to discourage potential emigrants:  
 
Here the earth’s rotting surface was overrun with lizards, eels, snakes, reptiles and 
monstrous and highly poisonous insects […] Most caterpillars, butterflies, centipedes, 
beetles, spiders, frogs and toads, were giant-sized, and multiplying in number beyond 
imagination.39 
 
The new colonizers, still according to de Pauw, encountered terrible reproductive difficulties, 
since the “climate of the New World concealed a hidden vice, which to this day is 
inconducive to the multiplication of the human race.” Worse, the rare children who were born 
in this new land had a low life expectancy: “the suffocating malignancy of the atmosphere 
affected them right from the cradle, and strange illnesses cut them down at a young age.”40 
 
Such exaggerations explain, in turn, why Founding Fathers like Franklin, Jefferson and 
Madison devoted so much energy, and much of their correspondence, to refuting the 
arguments put forth by de Pauw, the first example of a European truly committed to the 
systematic denigration of America.41  
 
Two centuries later it was no longer possible to characterize the United States as a country 
that could not be civilized. On the contrary, it was now the excess of American civilization, 
American hyper-modernity, that nourished anti-American sentiment. Some 
Americanophobes, like the communist writer Roger Vailland, mixed humour and irony in their 
                                                
38 Ibid., p. 8 
39 Ibid., p. 6.  
40 Ibid., p. 34.  
41 See James W. Ceaser, Reconstructing America, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997, pp. 19-65 and D. 
Lacorne, “L’écartèlement de ‘l’homme atlantique’ ” in Christine Fauré and Tom Bishop (eds.), L’Amérique des 
Français, Paris, François Bourin, 1992, pp. 169-175.  
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perfectly reactionary denunciation of the French enthusiasm for what was, then, a recent 
American invention, the refrigerator:  
  
I have never really understood what use a Frigidaire could ever be in a country like 
France, where, apart from two moderate months in a year, and then again not every 
year, the climate is uniformly so cold that a window pantry is quite enough to keep till 
Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday the leftovers from Sunday’s lamb roast. Those of 
my friends who own one use it mainly to produce little cubes of ice, which are meant 
to be added to a glass of wisky (sic), and which alter its taste. Wisky, besides, has 
grown so dear that their Frigidaire no longer serves anything but a symbolic 
purpose.42  
 
In its most extreme form, Americanophobia today expresses itself in a morbid desire for the 
military defeat of America, or even for the destruction of America. To sweeten his deadly pill, 
Dr Baudrillard thus claimed, a few days after the trauma of 9/11 that each of us, French, 
secretly wished the death of America. This was our schadenfreude, our secret joy at the 
suffering of others – a suffering that is necessary and justified because Americans well 
deserved it! Our jubilation, according to Baudrillard, was proportional to our “terrorist 
imagination,” supposedly shared by all well-meaning men and women. The “sacrificial” 
nature of the attack was beyond description. It displayed violence at its best – a strange 
mixture of “the white magic of cinema, and the black magic of terrorism.” The destruction of 
the twin towers ultimately fulfilled the dream of the West: “our aversion to any final or 
permanent world order.” Hence this stubborn “fact,” more real than all others, despite 
Baudrillard’s well-known aversion for the very possibility of a reality principle: 
 
We desired this event, each one of us wished it to happen, for it is impossible not to 
wish the annihilation of such an hegemonic superpower. Even though this is quite 
contrary to Western moral values, it is a fact, and this fact precisely reveals the 
pathetic violence of all efforts to deny it.43 
 
And yet, such an extreme example of Americanophobia is not a recent phenomenon in 
France. It was well entrenched in the France of the 1930s, with classics on the subject of 
                                                
42 Roger Vailland, La Tribune des Nations, 14 March 1956, quoted in L’Amérique dans les têtes, op. cit., p. 29.  
43 Jean Baudrillard, “L’esprit du terrorisme,” my italics, Le Monde, 2 November 2001. For François Guery, there is 
an obvious and direct connection between Duhamel and Baudrillard. When young students read the Scènes de la 
vie future, writes Guery, they think “it’s Baudrillard talking about America. They haven’t heard of Duhamel. But 
Duhamel is nothing but Baudrillard.” F. Guery, “L’Amérique impensable?,” Philosophie Politique, n° 7, December 
1995, p. 14-15. 
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French decadence like Georges Duhamel’s Scènes de la vie future (Scenes from the Future 
-1930), Robert Aron’s and Arnaud Dandieu’s La decadence de la nation française (The 
Decadence of the French Nation - 1931) or their Cancer américain (American Cancer) 
published in the same year, or again Daniel Rops’ Le Monde sans âme (A World Without A 
Soul - 1932), to which should be added the works of partisans of a French spiritual 
renaissance like Jacques Maritain, Alexandre Marc and Emmanuel Mounier.44 But the latter 
did not secretly wish the death of America; their only dream was to check the evil of the age: 
the proliferation of American materialistic values.  
 
For Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu, the editors of Ordre Nouveau, the degradation of the 
French spirit, or French “republican decadence,” was due to “the full rationalization of 
modern society, which under the auspices of Ford, Taylor and Young, has dehumanized all 
our frames of reference .”45 The adoption by the French elites of a new “industrial dogma,” 
amounted to a twofold betrayal: Betrayal of the old patriotic, emotional enthusiasm derived 
from the French revolutionary tradition, and betrayal of the French capitalistic tradition. From 
a purely “material and quantitative” perspective, according to Aron and Dandieu, France had 
“already lost the battle, and sacrificed itself upon the altar of social structures utterly hostile 
and foreign to her.” In this perspective, the French had become the “parasites” of the 
American empire, “conquered minds” comparable to the Graeculi of the old Roman empire, 
poor teachers oblivious of the meaning of what they “copied or taught.”46 In a grand élan 
heralding the anti-capitalist utopias of the thirties, Aron and Dandieu attacked the 
“cosmopolitan plutocracy,” which in submitting France to the supra-national order of the 
Young plan, had destroyed “all manifestations of love for the land and the nation.” The war 
debt settlement did produce the terrible feeling, accepted as a matter of fact by all the grands 
bourgeois,  “that France was done for”. Anticipating the personnalistes theses of Emmanuel 
Mounier, the future editor-in-chief of the quarterly Esprit, Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu 
offered a new solution to the utter degeneration of France: a “return to a real, sentimental 
and anti-rational individualism.” The aim was vague but grandiose. Whatever the cost, it was 
an urgent task to recover the revolutionary patriotic élan, a taste for self-affirmation, a 
renewed acceptance of the “risks of victory, which demand energy and aggressiveness47.” 
The Americanophobia of the thirties effectively expressed, to use François Furet’s words, a 
                                                
44 Philippe Roger writes, “The intellectual Americanophobia of the Twenties and the Thirties still remains the 
unsurpassed horizon of French anti-Americanism.,” L’ennemi américain, op. cit., p. 358. On this period, Jean-
Louis Loubet del Bayle, Les non-conformistes des années trente, Paris, Seuil, 1969, is essential reading. 
45 Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu, Décadence de la nation française, Paris, Rieder, 1931, pp. 107-108 
46 Ibid., p. 115-116. Continuing this tradition, Régis Debray describes the attitude of a true graeculus of modern 
times in his pamphlet, L’édit de Caracalla ou plaidoyer pour les Etats-Unis d’Occident par Xavier de C***, Paris, 
Fayard, 2002. 
47 A. Dandieu and R. Aron, ibid., pp. 243 et 57. 
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certain “pseudo-Nietzcheism”48 that gave central importance to the exaltation of the will 
against the cold rationalizations of an Homo oeconomicus, supposedly exemplified by 
American bankers and captains of industry.  
 
In Le Cancer Américain, Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu took stock of the gravity of the 
American disease, a subtly insidious, surreptitious cancer which penetrated all human 
communities, beginning with our cities, our universities, indeed our minds, since, they 
pointed out, “America is a method, a technique, a sickness of the mind.”49 The link with 
Georges Duhamel is undeniable; it is akin also to the concerns of Emmanuel Mounier who, in 
his written review of Duhamel’s Scènes de la Vie Future, warmly applauded the author for his 
denunciation of “Americanism,” that “barbarism which threatens the entire human edifice” in 
the name of a progressive civilization destined to control the fate of the human species. An 
ultimate consequence would be nothing less than the “extermination of all individual life 
forms.” Faced with the terrifying emergence of “idolatrous mechanism,” the civilized 
individual, according to Mounier, had no choice but to “wake up to the alarm” in order “to 
save the future of mankind, whatever it might hold.”50  
  
The founding manifesto of the quarterly Esprit took up the same themes in 1932, implicitly 
targeting the grand American tyranny, whose drastic effects called for a healthy revolt. The 
consequences, if the authors of the manifesto were to be believed, were quite clear: 
“Societies governed like businesses; savings dilapidated to adapt man to machine and to 
extract only material profit from human effort”; a private life torn apart by appetites and 
desires, totally disordered and pushed to all forms of homicide and suicide (…).” The 
solution, again, was to save man “by making him conscious of his true identity,” while 
accepting the “permanent fate of the Spirit, without any attachment to its temporal 
manifestations” without enslaving it to the search for profit. The final call for freedom was “It 
is time to free heroic action from bitterness and joy from mediocrity.”51  
 
Strictly speaking, the exalted rhetoric of the editors of l’Ordre Nouveau and Esprit, was not 
just French in inspiration. Behind the spectre of a decadent France was that of a decadent 
Europe, and the defence of a French spiritual renewal echoed the thoughts and writings of 
                                                
48 The expression is borrowed from François Furet, Le passé d’une illusion, Paris, Livre de Poche, 1998, p. 504. 
49 Le cancer américain, p. 80, quoted in Loubet del Bayle, op. cit., p. 259 
50 Mounier, Revue de culture générale, October 1930, pp. 14-21, quoted in Jean-Louis Loubet del Bayle, Les non-
conformistes des années trente, Paris, Seuil, 1969, p. 258. On Mounier and America, see especially Seth Armus, 
“The Eternal enemy: Emmanuel Mounier’s Esprit and French Anti-Americanism,” French Historical Studies, n° 2, 
Spring 2001, pp. 271-303. 
51 Folder announcing the founding of Esprit, February 1932, reproduced in J-L Loubet del Bayle, op.cit., pp. 448-
449. 
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an influential German philosopher, Martin Heidegger.52 Heidegger shared with his French 
literary counterparts a similar Americanophobia. His enemy was the twin facets of modern 
capitalism: American and Bolshevik materialism and mechanism, the true causes of Europe’s 
fatal sickness, and the manifestations of an unspeakable “emasculation (Entmachtung) of the 
Spirit.”  
 
Europe, according to Heidegger, “lies in a [pair of] pincers between Russia and America, 
which are metaphysically the same”53 because they promote a single value: equality, i.e. 
conformity and the destruction of all social ranks. This, in turn, according to Heidegger, 
produces in both countries a “boundless etcetera of indifference and always-the-sameness,” 
which can only lead to the destruction of “every world-creating impulse of the Spirit.” Hence 
this “onslaught” of what Heidegger defined as “the demonic, in the sense of destructive evil.” 
What was the solution proposed by the great German philosopher? A Nietzschean solution, 
not without similarity to the Nazis’ fascist ideology: the only way to recover the “true essence 
of the Spirit” consisted in recovering the “true power and beauty of the body, all sureness and 
boldness in combat, all authenticity and inventiveness of the understanding (…).” The 
“awakening of the Spirit,” concluded Heidegger, demanded that the German nation “take on 
its historical mission” in combatting the Americano-Bolshevik axis of evil.54 
 
Two totalitarianisms, Soviet and American 
 
Post-Second World War Americanophobia was remarkably similar to pre-World War II 
Americanophobia. Consider this statement written in 1981 by Alain de Benoist, one of the 
intellectual leaders of the French New Right: “The truth is that there exist two distinct forms of 
totalitarianism, with very different effects, but each as redoubtable as the other. The first, in 
the East, imprisons, persecutes, tortures the body; it however leaves room for hope. The 
other one in the West leads to the creation of happy robots. It air-conditions hell and kills the 
soul.”55 The same argument was untiringly repeated by authors as politically apart as Michel 
Jobert, Jacques Thibau, Jean-Marie Benoist, or Anicet Le Pors, in books with revealing titles: 
                                                
52 The influence of Heidegger on the editors of Ordre nouveau is well documented by J-L Loubet del Bayle, ibid., 
p. 90. Another probable source of inspiration is the essay by Gina Lombroso, La rançon du machinisme (Fr. 
trans.), Paris, Payot, 1931. 
53 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, [1935], New Haven, Yale University Press, 1974 p. 45 
(based on a lecture delivered in 1935 at the University of Freiburg. “I have made no change in the content”, 
explained Heidegger in his  Preface to the 1953 German edition).  
54 Ibid., pp. 46, 47, 50, respectively.  
55 Alain de Benoist, quoted in D. Lacorne et al., L’Amérique dans les têtes, op. cit., p. 33. Curiously, the same 
argument was defended by more moderate politicians, strongly inspired by the Gaullist political tradition, such as  
Michel Jobert, Jacques Thibau or Jean-Marie Benoist. Other major intellectuals like Merleau Ponty, Jean-Paul 
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Pavances pour une Europe défunte (1976), La France Colonisée (1980), Marianne à 
l’encan(1980)… 
 
It should be clear at this point that a significant part of “Old Europe”’s intelligentsia was not 
just being critical of America. It rejected all US social and political values as barbaric, to 
prevent, in Heidegger’s cruel words, a horrible “emasculation of the Spirit.” 
 
“Old America”: a model for Europe?  
Are French intellectuals today as Americanophobe as they were in the thirties or at the end 
of the Cold War? I do not believe so. Baudrillard’s wild imagination is probably the exception 
that proves the rule. The critical stance taken by France and Germany, during the Iraqi crisis, 
was not a sign of a total rejection of American values, quite the contrary. Economic 
liberalism, economic globalization and American democracy were not described as “cancers” 
or instruments of the “Spirit’s emasculation.” The stated goal of the Bush Administration– the 
elimination of weapons of mass destruction – was not being questioned. What was contested 
was the means chosen to attain these objectives and especially the time-table of military 
intervention adopted by the Pentagon. With his ironical comment about a powerless “Old 
Europe,” Donald Rumsfeld forgot that Old Europe -- the Europe of the Brussels Convention 
(to draft a future European constitution)--, was also a remarkably creative political enterprise. 
The delegates of the European Convention had chosen the oldest political model available to 
them, that of “Old America,” i.e. the America of the Philadelphia Convention, of the Founding 
Fathers, of the rule of law and of sophisticated constitutional compromises… A more vibrant 
homage could never be paid to America, at the very time when trans-Atlantic 
misunderstandings were degenerating into mutual abuse.  
 
How many in the Bush administration still cared for the glorious model of “Old America”? 
Certainly not the President or his praetorian guard. A little more attention paid to the creation 
of a new constitutional Europe, a little more respect for the reasonable (but no doubt 
debatable) criticism expressed by the leaders of “Old Europe” would probably have averted 
numerous misunderstandings. Indeed, in the end, nothing illustrates the proximity of the two 
models, European and American, better than the motto chosen by the two federated 
continents: “E Pluribus Unum,” say the Americans; “Unity in Diversity,” states the Preamble 
                                                                                                                                                   
Sartre or Etienne Gilson defended comparable viewpoints at the end of the 1940s. See Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: 
French Intellectuals, 1944-1956, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1994. 
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of the future European constitution, drafted by the Brussels delegates in the year 2003.56  By 
choice, and without realizing it, we’ve all become Americans, in spite of it all!  
 
TABLE ONE 
Question: “When you think of the United States, what words and images come to your 
mind?” 
 
 
 
POSITIVE ASPECTS 
% respondents who mention:  
% 
43* 
Grandeur / Gigantism 14 
Power of the United States 12 
Wealth 4 
Freedom 4 
Superior technology 4 
Modernism 3 
“I like this country”  1 
Dynamism 1 
The economy 6 
Economic strength / a strong economy 4 
A strong currency/ a strong dollar  1 
Politics 4 
“Gives military support to other countries” 3 
Other positive aspects 3 
 
NEGATIVE ASPECTS 
56* 
“I don’t like the United States” 2 
Violence 21 
Violence  14 
Crime, delinquency, drugs 7 
The death penalty, executions 2 
Free sale of arms 2 
Negative psychological traits 14 
“They’re excessive in everything” 3 
Vanity, arrogance 2 
Individualism 2 
Extremism 1 
Puritanism 1 
Craziness / “a crazy people” 1 
Selfishness 1 
Intolerance 1 
Criticism of American influence 11 
They control  other countries 9 
“They think they’re the world’s policemen” 2 
“They want to impose their way of life  2 
                                                
56 See, D. Lacorne, “E Pluribus Unum, a motto for Europe?,” Le Débat, January 2003, pp. 88-97 and a special 
issue of Critique Internationale on US and European constitution-making (Critique Internationale, December 2003, 
pp.  XXX ) 
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The economy 7 
“American imperialism” 3 
Economic hegemony 2 
Capitalism / Profit-seeking 2 
Food 3 
Poor food 2 
The obesity of Americans 1 
Other negative aspects 2 
 
NEUTRAL ASPECTS 
 
43* 
Money  4 
Economic liberalism 3 
A multiracial society 3 
Weapons  3 
Capitalism 2 
A federation of states 2 
The dollar  2 
The “American Dream” 1 
Geography 8 
The Statue of Liberty 2 
Wide open spaces 2 
Hollywood 2 
Skyscrapers 2 
Other geographical features 2 
Food 6 
McDonald’s 3 
Fast food restaurants 3 
Coca-Cola 2 
American Personalities 6 
Among them, Bill Clinton 4 
Politics 5 
Power 3 
A world power 2 
A military power 1 
Other neutral aspects 2 
Brings nothing to mind 2 
No answer 5 
 
*Multiple responses account for totals (and subtotals) greater than 100. 
 
Source: “France-Etats-Unis: regards croisés”, SOFRES/French American Foundation poll, May 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
[To appear  in With Us or Against Us. Essays on Global Anti-Americanism, 
New York, Palgrave, 2005, ( Tony Judt and Denis Lacorne eds.)  
 
